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Poverty and Justice: Competing Lenses on International Economic Law 
 
Oisin Suttle 
 
 
John Linarelli (ed.), Research Handbook on Global Justice and International 
Economic Law (Edward Elgar, 2013) 
 
Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer (ed.), Poverty and the International Economic Legal 
System: Duties to the WorldÕs Poor (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
I. 
 
Posner and Sykes observe of international economic law (IEL) that it is the only area 
of international law in which law and economics, as a distinctive methodology, has 
played a significant role. Elsewhere, they lament, international law scholarship has 
been dominated by doctrinal, historical or philosophical approaches.
1
 In fact, their 
point might be put more strongly; whereas economic analysis has had little impact in 
other areas of international law, in IEL its dominance has historically eclipsed all 
other theoretical approaches.
2
 However, just as economic analysis has begun to spread 
to other areas of international law, in large part inspired by the work of political 
scientists, so its hegemony in IEL has recently been challenged by scholars applying 
insights from human rights, political theory and moral philosophy.
3
 
 
Many explanations might be offered for the late arrival of political theorists, in 
particular, to the study of IEL. Most obviously, the hegemony of economic analysis, 
and in particular the power of comparative advantage in trade scholarship, left little 
space for alternative theoretical approaches; destabilizing the free trade consensus, in 
both theory and practice, was a necessary prerequisite for applying approaches that 
emphasize the distributive and conflictual nature of economic regulation.
4
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes Economic Foundations of International Law (Belknap Press 2013) 
3  
2
 This story is well told in Robert Howse, ÔFrom Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of 
the Multilateral Trading RegimeÕ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 94-117 
3
 As well as the volumes under review, prominent book-length contributions include: T. Cottier et al. 
(eds) Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford University Press 2005); Frank Garcia Trade, 
Inequality, and Justice : Towards a Liberal Theory of Just Trade (Martinus Nijhoff 2003); Aaron 
James Fairness in Practice : A Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford University Press 2012); 
Chi Carmody, Frank Garcia and Jonh Linarelli (eds), Global Justice and International Economic Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012); Frank Garcia Global Justice and International Economic Law : 
Three Takes (Cambridge  University Press 2013) 
4
 This point is well made, albeit to a different purpose, in Fernando R. Teson and Jonathan Klick, 
ÔGlobal Justice and TradeÕ in C. Carmody, F. Garcia and J. Linarelli (eds), Global Justice and 
International Economic Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 217-260 
Page 2 of 13!
Dependency theorists and the movement for a New International Economic Order 
constituted a first generation of challengers; their retreat saw a reassertion of free 
trade dogmas that remained largely unchallenged until after the Uruguay Round. 
 
Two further explanations, however, relate more closely to the project of international 
political theory. The first is the lack of consensus within this field of study. 
Domestically, our tradition of political theory goes back to Aristotle. We can draw on 
various full worked out theories of justice including, most prominently, liberal, 
libertarian or utilitarian. Disagreement persists, but it is substantially structured by 
localized consensus. By contrast international justice became a serious focus of 
political philosophy only in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
5
 Theories are less 
developed. Intuitions are less clear. There is simply no agreement amongst 
philosophers on what justice might demand beyond the state. Indeed, as Thomas 
Nagel observes, Òit is not clear what the main questions are, let alone the main 
possible answersÓ.
6
 If expert consensus is a prerequisite for epistemic communities to 
influence policy debates, then it is little surprise that international political theory has 
remained on the sidelines.
7
  
 
The second explanation reflects the extent to which the global justice debate has 
polarized around statist and cosmopolitan positions: the former emphasizing the 
distinctiveness of justice within political communities and denying any thick duties of 
justice beyond the state; while the latter denies that distinctiveness, emphasizing the 
common basis of duties towards compatriots and foreigners. Neither position has 
proved well suited to addressing the practical challenges of IEL: statism lacks the 
necessary critical purchase; while cosmopolitanism struggles to identify what 
elements are worth retaining from the present system.
8
 Thus, even if a true consensus 
developed on either position, it is unclear how far it could inform specifically legal 
scholarship. 
 
These diagnoses, if accepted, suggest a number of challenges for further research to 
foster a more productive engagement between political philosophy and international 
economic law. The first lies in identifying those areas where genuine distributive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 Political theoryÕs international turn is commonly dated to one of two publications, from 1972 and 
1979 respectively: Peter Singer, ÔFamine, Affluence, and MoralityÕ (1972) 1 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 229-243; Charles R. Beitz Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University 
Press 1979) 
6
 Thomas Nagel, ÔThe Problem of Global JusticeÕ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 113-147, p. 
113 
7
 Peter M. Haas, ÔDo Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution ControlÕ 
(1989) 43 International Organization 377-403, p. 380 
8
 Similar points are developed in James, supra note 3, p. 9-15; Oisin Suttle, ÔEquality in Global 
Commerce: Towards a Political Theory of International Economic LawÕ (2015) European Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming) 
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questions arise in economic regulation; this seems best left to economists.
9
 The 
second is the progressive development of international political theory. Philosophers 
enjoy some comparative advantage in this task; but theoretically minded lawyers can 
also make an important contribution, particularly in guiding theoretical work towards 
principles that can actually be applied to address concrete problems.
10
 The third, for 
which lawyers are uniquely suited, lies in working out the implications of existing 
theories for specific contested questions in IEL. 
 
II. 
 
The essays in John LinarelliÕs Research Handbook on Global Justice and 
International Economic Law range across these three areas. Only one is concerned 
primarily with the first, economic, challenge (Maneschi, ÔInternational trade theory 
and comparative advantageÕ). Five address, to varying degrees, the second challenge, 
of elaborating and defending theoretical approaches tailored to critiquing IEL (Brock, 
ÔTheories of global justiceÕ; Petersmann, ÔHuman rights and international economic 
law in the 21
st
 centuryÕ; Garcia and Ciko, ÔTheories of justice and international 
economic lawÕ; Chimni, ÔCritical theory and international economic law: a theird 
world approach to international law (TWAIL) perspectiveÕ; and Linarelli, ÔLaw rights 
and developmentÕ). The remaining five fall under the third heading, building bridges 
between theory and practice (Lim, ÔRegional trade agreements and the poverty 
agendaÕ; Clements ÔMultilateral development banks and the International Monetary 
FundÕ; Lundan, ÔHuman rights issues in multinational value chainsÕ; Correa. 
ÔIntellectual property rights and international economic governanceÕ; He and Murphy, 
ÔGlobal social justice at the WTO? The role of NGOs in constructing global social 
contractsÕ). 
 
This is the second volume on global justice and IEL that Linarelli has edited in as 
many years. Thus a reasonable place to start in assessing it is to inquire what purpose 
this new volume is intended to serve. His previous volume, with Frank Garcia and 
Chi Carmody, was explicitly concerned to advance new perspectives, whether 
theoretical or applied, on questions of justice and IEL.
11
 This Handbook, as its title 
suggests, has a more practical, and indeed pedagogical, goal. It is characterized as a 
Òbroad yet deep surveyÓ of approaches that the editor suggests can serve variously to 
critique, guide and justify IEL. It aspires to Òstimulate discussion and have some 
impact in legal and policy venuesÓ; however in so far as it seeks to advance the 
understanding of justice in IEL scholarship, it does so by aggregation and 
dissemination, rather than significant progressive development. This is an important 
task, and one in which it is generally successful. It provides accessible introductions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
 This does not mean, of course, that we must be limited by mainstream or consensus views amongst 
economists. For a critical review of the economic evidence, Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of 
Trade as If Development Really Mattered (United Nations Development Programme 2001) 
10
 Amongst lawyers, Frank Garcia has perhaps done most to bridge this gap. 
11
 Carmody, Garcia and Linarelli, supra note 3. 
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to a number of theoretical perspectives, and illuminates emergent problems of justice 
in various IEL practices to which those perspectives might readily be applied. IEL 
scholars unfamiliar with the theoretical literature on global justice will find much here 
to stimulate thought, and to tempt them to further engagement. Scholars already 
familiar with perspectives represented are unlikely to find anything of great novelty; 
but given its consolidating goal, that is hardly a criticism, and indeed may be a 
positive feature. In a field as complicated and confusing as global justice and IEL, 
there is merit in clearly distinguishing consolidation from innovation. 
 
Before addressing the individual contributions it is worth asking how far this volume 
as a whole exhibits the two key failings, of uncertainty and irrelevance, above 
ascribed to scholarship in this area. 
 
On the count of relevance, it acquits itself well. Theory is linked to practice, 
particularly in the more theoretical contributions. A number of the theoretical 
approaches represented (human rights, ÔinternalÕ approaches to theorizing justice, 
TWAIL, law and development) are self-consciously practice oriented; while the 
chapter on more conventionally philosophical theories of global justice, which are 
most prone to this failing, includes discussion of thinkers who have sought to derive 
policy implications from their theories, and indeed is written by a scholar, Gillian 
Brock, who has in other work done much to advance a middle path between the statist 
and cosmopolitan poles discussed above.
12
 Some of the more practical contributions 
are less satisfying in this regard; while invoking the language of justice at various 
points, it is sometimes unclear how far explicitly theoretical insights inform their 
analysis. The promise of theory is surely that it can bring some order to our bare 
intuition that there is something troubling about poverty, inequality and 
underdevelopment, clarifying which problems we have duties to solve, and how those 
duties should be prioritized. A greater emphasis on this role might have improved the 
more practically oriented contributions. That said, for teachers its absence offers a 
potentially fruitful pedagogical opportunity, as the various theoretical chapters might 
be applied to interrogate the conclusions in the more practical papers. 
 
Turning to uncertainty, it is obviously unfair to expect this, or indeed any, text to 
resolve the pervasive uncertainty in thinking about global justice. Nor, given its 
consolidating and disseminating ambitions, would it be appropriate to seek to do so. 
However, by presenting a range of competing approaches, with little by way of 
editorial comment or direct engagement between contributors, there is a risk that this 
volume may further the impression amongst non-specialists that global justice theory 
is incurably indeterminate, and as such offers little prospect of a yardstick against 
which law and practice might sensibly be measured. The practical problems of IEL 
demand all-things-considered responses, which in turn require not only identifying 
justice-relevant values, but also adjudicating between those values. To the extent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
 Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford University Press 2009) 
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competing theories place different weights on, for example, individual freedom, 
socioeconomic equality and national responsibility, they will suggest different 
answers to such questions as the appropriate goals of IFI conditionality, or the 
permissibility of various preferential trading arrangements. In these circumstances 
being introduced to each theory is of little value, unless we also have some tools for 
adjudicating between them. There may be academic value in seeing how different 
approaches prescribe different responses; but when prescriptions diverge, some 
criterion of choice is required. That said, while it is easy to diagnose this problem, it is 
harder to suggest a solution. Substantial uncertainty is a feature of this area of 
scholarship. A monograph can defend one approach against alternatives, but this is 
obviously not possible in a broader survey volume. I would, however, have welcomed 
a more detailed introduction, in which the editor might both recognize this challenge, 
and perhaps suggest some response to it. 
 
A number of the individual contributions merit mention. BrockÕs chapter on ÔTheories 
of Global JusticeÕ provides an accessible introduction to the relevant debates in 
political theory. Lawyers will find much here that is new to them, and copious 
references to philosophers whose work has clear normative implications for 
international economic governance. The debates reviewed are debates amongst 
liberals, and as such will directly engage the commitments of many IEL scholars. 
Here, as elsewhere, the editorÕs concern to avoid the trap of radical (and hence sterile) 
critique means readers may find it more difficult to disregard the normative 
implications of the theories addressed. 
 
This is followed by a paper by Petersmann, whose extensive work on 
constitutionalization, IEL and human rights will be familiar to many readers. Within 
the global justice approach, Petersmann stands out as a thinker who is more 
sympathetic than most to free trade, both for instrumental reasons and as reflecting an 
interest in protecting individual market freedoms.  Here, he integrates insights from 
Rawls and Kant, and in particular a challenge to restrictive and anti-cosmopolitan 
conceptions of international public reason, to argue for an integrated role for IEL and 
human rights in judicially protecting both individual rights and international public 
goods. 
 
Garcia and Ciko examine a number of approaches to engaging IEL and global justice 
theory, distinguishing between external approaches, of the kind most prominent in 
political theory, and internal approaches, which seek to derive evaluative principles 
from within the system or practice being addressed. Garcia has elsewhere developed 
one such internal approach, which understands justice in trade in terms of consent, 
Òthe essential characteristic which makes É an economic exchange ÒtradeÓ rather 
than theft, coercion, exploitation or the likeÓ
13
. Internal approaches avoid the 
irrelevance challenge noted above by beginning from the specific practices with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
 Garcia, Three Takes, supra note 3, p. 219 
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which we are concerned, and identifying principles relevant to those practices. 
However, while avoiding irrelevance, a persistent concern with these approaches is 
that, by taking the relevant practices as a starting point, they lack critical purchase in 
circumstances where external approaches might lead us to reject, or at least 
fundamentally restructure, those practices as a whole.
14
 
 
The following five contributions address specific issues in IEL: trade preferences and 
regional trade agreements; multilateral development banks; human rights in 
multinational business; international intellectual property governance; and the role of 
NGOs. In each case they introduce aspects of the relevant issue that, at least 
potentially, raise concerns about global justice. As noted above, these chapters are 
less engaged with the theoretical approaches than one might like, but they provide 
interesting case studies, and an opportunity to reflect on both the need for, and the 
challenges of, applying theories of justice to international economic governance. He 
and MurphyÕs chapter on NGOs stands out as an effort to more closely integrate 
theory and practice, analyzing the role of NGOs in IEL in terms of a global social 
contract, understood as a normative ideal expressing a global conception of social 
justice and democracy. NGOs are then seen as a mechanism for both constructing and 
embodying such contracts, enhancing accountability and legitimacy between 
international institutions and citizens. 
 
Following these more practical chapters, Chimni examines IEL through third world 
approaches to international law (TWAIL). This critical approach contrasts with the 
predominantly liberal foundations of the other theoretical chapters. Its emphasis on 
the political and economic forces shaping IEL reflects its roots in Marxism, and to 
that extent may struggle for a hearing from what Chimni terms Ômainstream 
international economic law scholarshipÕ. In particular, its skepticism of dominant 
economic approaches will lead many readers to dismiss it. However, as Chimni 
shows, many of its prescriptions reflect concerns also emerging from the (liberal) 
cosmopolitan global justice literature. As such, its presentation together with those 
approaches may stimulate further engagement between scholars in both traditions. By 
contrast ManeschiÕs chapter, on international trade theory and comparative advantage, 
offers little that will be unfamiliar to IEL scholars; although its presentation 
immediately after ChimniÕs serves to emphasize the extent to which critical and 
mainstream perspectives can diverge. 
 
The final contribution, by Linarelli, offers an intellectual history of law and 
development as a discrete field of inquiry. While law and development has been 
traditionally understood as a study of the domestic institutions that affect statesÕ 
development prospects, Linarelli links it to IEL, both through the impact IEL has on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14
 Garcia discusses the merits of this approach in more detail in his recent monograph: Ibid., pp. 209-
215, 263-272. See also James, supra note 3, pp. 25-31. For a critical view: Laura Valentini, ÔGlobal 
Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, FunctionalismÕ (2011) 19:4 
Journal of Political Philosophy 399-418 
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development, and through a critique of law and development as an ideological project 
which seeks to integrate developing states in the international economic system. It 
questions the idea of a human right to development, whether as a legal or a moral 
claim, suggesting that even as a moral right, it requires further specification as to both 
subjects and content. This is linked to a history of the law and development 
movement, understood in turn as an expression of modernization theory, new 
institutional economics, and human rights and capabilities. How this discussion fits 
with the volume as a whole is somewhat unclear. However, as a conclusion it 
provides a useful reminder that IEL is neither the sole cause of, nor the sole solution 
to, the challenges of poverty and development that motivate much of the global 
justice debate; domestic institutions cannot be left out of the story. 
 
III. 
 
LinarelliÕs emphasis on development provides a useful bridge to the second volume 
under review, Poverty and the International Economic Legal System: Duties to the 
WorldÕs Poor, edited by Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer. There is much in this 
volume; but one of its recurring themes is the need to disaggregate development from 
poverty alleviation, and to recognize the independent normative pull that the latter 
concept exerts. It is with that claim that I therefore begin. 
 
It is frequently observed, particularly by those seeking to deflate the more ambitious 
egalitarian claims of cosmopolitans, that the fact of absolute poverty means that 
questions of equality, or indeed of global justice, are largely beside the point. 
Considerations of humanity are enough to condemn the existing international order, 
without engaging with these more contested normative questions.
15
 The fact of 
absolute poverty, this argument suggests, makes discussions of global justice 
superfluous or, at least, premature.
16
 In so far as this volume proposes poverty, 
whether relative or absolute, as an appropriate critical lens for IEL, it appears 
substantially to reflect this view. At a number of points contributors link poverty 
alleviation to other normative schemes, most prominently international human rights 
law. However, it is the fact of IELÕs effects on poverty, rather the analysis of those 
effects in terms of human rights or global justice, that is the principal focus. It is 
therefore worth reflecting on the limits of this approach. 
 
The most obvious difficulty it faces is that poverty, while undoubtedly an urgent 
challenge, is not the only value, whether legal or moral, that bears on international 
economic regulation. This is particularly the case when, as in a number of 
contributions, poverty is understood to include both absolute and relative poverty. We 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15
 e.g.: Nagel, supra note 6, p. 118. A similar thought motivates Amartya Sen The Idea of Justice 
(Oxford University Press 2009), 24-27 
16
 The line of thought is criticized in Brian Barry, ÔHumanity and Justice in Global PerspectiveÕ in J. 
Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds), Nomox XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law (NYU 
Press 1982) 219-52 
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may recognize that we have pro tanto reasons, whether legal or moral, to be 
concerned about poverty, but we cannot know, without a broader analysis, what we 
have all-things-considered reasons to do. For example, Picker (ÔAnti-poverty v. the 
international economic legal order? A legal cultural critiqueÕ) highlights the 
distinction between poverty alleviation and economic development, and the extent to 
which measures pursuing the latter may hinder the former. To the extent this is the 
case, it suggests that poverty alleviation should be a more explicit part of the 
conversation about IEL and development. However, there is little in this volume that 
would help us to resolve the potential conflict between these values. Perhaps poverty 
should trump development, or vice versa? Elsewhere, we find a potential choice 
between poverty alleviation and efficiency (Cottier, ÔPoverty, redistribution and 
international trade regulationÕ). We need a thicker normative picture to resolve these 
conflicts. 
 
A second concern with this emphasis on poverty is that it risks obscuring the 
importance of the state in mediating between IEL and severe poverty. In many cases, 
as Linarelli emphasizes in respect of development, domestic institutions are the most 
direct determinants of poverty. Concerns to alleviate poverty internationally thus 
translate into concerns to reform institutions in afflicted countries. However, unless 
qualified by due regard for other important values, most obviously national autonomy, 
this insight can support prescriptions that, while potentially effective for poverty 
alleviation, should be rejected for other reasons. This worry is raised particularly by 
the chapters on international financial regulation, a number of which are concerned to 
assess how far institutional reforms incentivized by multilateral and bilateral 
development lending affect poverty and, where those effects are negative, to diagnose 
the reasons for this. (e.g Thirkell-White, ÔAmbitious goals, limited tools: The IMF 
and poverty reductionÕ; Ellis, ÔThe World Bank: Fighting poverty Ð ideology versus 
accountabilityÕ; Buckley, ÔThe direct contribution of the international financial system 
to global povertyÕ) What is underemphasized is the question of whether, apart entirely 
from the question of effectiveness, using conditional lending to stimulate institutional 
change is justifiable, having regard to the claims of affected countries to equal respect 
and autonomy.
17
 If we regard such schemes as discretionary then the fact of 
conditionality may be less troubling; but if we start from the premise that duties, 
whether legal or moral, are owed to those living in poverty beyond our borders, then it 
is less obvious that donors have any claim to determine what constitute satisfactory 
institutional reforms.
18
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17
 Ellis acknowledges this point, but it does not seem to play a significant role in his analysis. Rather, 
his argument for a more bottom-up approach to World Bank conditionality is primarily based on 
effectiveness. 
18
 The effect that thinking about international assistance in terms of justice rather than humanity has on 
choices about when and how that assistance is delivered is developed in Barry, supra note 15. The 
implications of understanding development lending in terms of justice are developed in Garcia, Three 
Takes, supra note 3, p. 95.  
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Admittedly these concerns can be avoided by emphasizing the specific goal of this 
volume, namely to analyze IEL in terms of its relationship to statesÕ obligations to 
reduce poverty. It is no criticism of a volume about IEL and poverty to note that it is 
not a volume about IEL and justice, or indeed about IEL and sovereignty. Further, in 
so far as poverty, as distinct from development, has been underemphasized in IEL 
scholarship to date, a volume on this specific question is wholeheartedly to be 
welcomed. However, to the extent that it is read with its narrower perspective in 
mind, its prescriptions must be similarly restricted, and so necessarily subject to being 
trumped by other values outside its normative focus. 
 
These preliminary concerns aside, there is much in this volume that will be of interest. 
 
A number of contributions are concerned to explore whether and to what extent 
poverty imposes legal obligations on governments, foreign and domestic. This 
question is often elided by philosophers concerned with global justice, many of whom 
have been quick to conclude both that severe poverty violates human rights, and that 
this imposes responsibilities both on the states in which the impoverished live, and on 
foreign governments, and indeed citizens.
19
 For lawyers, however, that move is more 
demanding, particularly given the authorsÕ decision to address both absolute and 
relative poverty. Schefer locates obligations to address both in the ICESCR, the 
former in a number of specific rights, and the latter in the progressive nature of 
obligations under that convention, and in the right against discrimination. (ÔPoverty, 
obligations and the international economic legal system: what are our duties to the 
global poor?Õ) Hakimi adopts ShueÕs respect/protect/fulfill typology in an effort to 
translate this recognition of povertyÕs link to human rights into an account of the 
specific obligations attaching to states in respect of poverty within and beyond their 
borders. (ÔHuman rights obligations to the poorÕ) She emphasizes the duty to protect, 
showing how this has different implications for states vis--vis their own populations, 
for whom the duty is general, and foreigners, in respect of whom it arises only given 
special relationships between the state and the human rights violator. However, it is 
not clear how broad this latter duty is. Would it, for example, extend to a duty to 
restrain companies from impairing human rights overseas? As Hakimi emphasizes, at 
least as regards less severe violations, international law significantly restricts statesÕ 
concern for those outside their own territory. However, it is difficult to see where 
exactly the line is. Besson takes up this question of how duties are allocated in moral 
rather than legal terms, arguing that human rights duties fall primarily on institutions, 
and only secondarily on individuals. (ÔThe allocation of anti-poverty rights duties: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
 See, most prominently, Thomas W. Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms (Polity 2002); Henry Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press 1996). For a recent restatement of the view that IEL 
violates (moral) human rights, Thomas Pogge, ÔAre We Violating the Human Rights of the World's 
PoorÕ (2011) 14 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 1-33. Even thinkers more hostile to cosmopolitanism have 
generally recognized severe poverty as a human rights concern, and as potentially calling for an 
international response. E.g.: David Miller National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford 
University Press 2007) p. 231. 
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Our rights, but whose duties?Õ) Further, she distinguishes between human rights 
duties, owed to specific right-holders, and more diffuse human rights responsibilities, 
which are both less determinate, and are not directed to particular right holders. While 
human rights duties fall primarily on domestic and regional institutions, 
responsibilities are more widely distributed, falling on other states and on 
international institutions. However, she argues, it is important not to conflate these 
responsibilities with duties; to do so would be to undermine the particular power of 
human rights as specific and doubly directed, identifying both rights holder and duty 
bearer. 
 
These contributions highlight the difficulty identifying a clear legal obligation on 
states, and by extension on IEL, to respond to poverty, whether relative or absolute, 
beyond our own borders. Certainly, they suggest that a straightforward human rights 
argument will not do the job. However, to the extent that is the case, it seems again to 
raise the problems noted above; if no conclusive legal imperative can be identified, 
how should concerns for poverty alleviation be integrated with other values that IEL 
should respect, protect and fulfill? As Besson observes, international human rights do 
not exhaust duties of global justice; these chapters seem then to imply that 
consideration of human rights against poverty must necessarily be embedded within 
wider theories of global justice more generally. 
 
These conceptual chapters comprise parts I and IV of the volume. They bracket 26 
contributions on the relationship between poverty and specific issues in IEL. These 
are in turn divided amongst trade, investment and commercial arbitration, 
international financial regulation, and effects on particularly vulnerable populations. I 
will not try to engage with each of these. However, a number merit particular 
mention. 
 
A number raise concerns about the institutional structures of IEL, and in particular the 
absence of constituencies within specific legal processes empowered or incentivized 
to advocate for poverty reduction. (Kee, ÔInternational Commercial Arbitration and 
Poverty, not obvious but (maybe) possibleÕ; Dimsey, ÔDimsey - Foreign direct 
investment and the alleviation of poverty - Is investment arbitration falling short of its 
goals?Õ; Daly and Melikian, ÔAccess to Justice in Dispute ResolutionÕ; Crespo, ÔFrom 
problem to potential - The need to go beyond investor-state disputes and integrate 
civil society, investors and state at the local levelÕ; Thirkell-White, ÔAmbitious goals, 
limited tools? The IMF and poverty reductionÕ; Buckley, ÔThe direct contribution of 
the international financial system to global povertyÕ) Each, in varying ways, addresses 
the same problem; the elaboration of rights and duties can have little impact unless 
appropriately motivated agents have an effective role in decision-making affecting 
those rights. Some thinkers would go further, making political empowerment rather 
than legal remedy the essential prerequisite to effective poverty alleviation. Sen, for 
example, has famously argued that famines do not occur in democracies, because 
democracy empowers individuals and incentivizes governments to take appropriate 
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preventative steps. In so far as the determinants of poverty are located in the 
international rather than domestic sphere, democracy cannot provide a general 
answer, notwithstanding the ambitions of deliberative democrats and globalization 
theorists. Identifying appropriate alternative mechanisms for making international 
institutions and legal processes more responsive to the demands of affected 
populations is therefore an important step. However, it is not simply a problem for 
poverty alleviation.
20
 Nor, in consequence, is it a challenge that can be analyzed 
solely from this perspective. Thus, taking one example, Crespo argues for integrating 
civil society more closely into decision-making relating to foreign direct investment. 
Despite the obvious attractions of this view, it necessarily implies a challenge to the 
role of the state in aggregating and, where necessary, trading off the interests of 
different constituencies. This in turn raises questions about the extent to which such 
trading off is permissible, particularly when those whose interests are discounted are 
already marginalized groups. This will presumably depend on how we answer the 
questions, adverted to earlier, about the proper relation between poverty alleviation, 
development, efficiency and autonomy, amongst other relevant values. This need not 
constitute a challenge to CrespoÕs proposal; it simply shows the inevitable limits of 
poverty as a normative lens. 
 
CottierÕs contribution analyses the interaction between relative and absolute poverty 
alleviation in the context of the trade regime. This chapter is interesting for the extent 
to which it emphasizes not only the normative imperative on the trade regime to 
alleviate poverty, but also the extent to which this constitutes a political prerequisite 
to the regimeÕs success. Various scholars have emphasized the ways the trade regime 
evolved to accommodate the post-war welfare state.
21
 Cottier however emphasizes 
another relation; the extent to which the welfare state was a political prerequisite to 
post-war liberalization, allowing states to compensate those who suffer as a result of 
free trade. Where liberalization has faced significant political opposition, he links this 
to the absence of effective welfare mechanisms. This argument is interesting because 
it grounds an argument for poverty alleviation as an instrumental requirement of the 
trade regime; we should address poverty not only because we (presumably) have a 
moral obligation to do so, but also because failing to do so would deprive us of the 
economic benefits of trade liberalization.
22
 It thus potentially side-steps a number of 
the concerns, raised above, about conflicting values; on this view, poverty alleviation 
supports free trade efficiency. 
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 See, for example, He and MurphyÕs contribution to the first volume under review. 
21
 John G. Ruggie, ÔInternational Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic OrderÕ (1982) 36 International Organization 379-415; Howse, supra note 2; 
Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism Re-Imagining the Global Economic Order 
(Oxofrd University Press 2011) pp. 190-200 
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 Crespo makes an analogous point in respect of investment protection: ÔFrom problem to potential Ð 
The need to go beyond investor-state disputes and integrate civil society, investors and state at the local 
levelÕ. 
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These applied chapters are perhaps strongest where they illustrate the operation of 
specific institutions, and their particular ideologies and pathologies. For example, 
Ellis provides an illuminating account not only of the ideological biases in World 
Bank policy-making, but also of the institutional characteristics that entrenched those 
biases, and the crises that destabilized them. (ÔThe World Bank: fighting poverty Ð 
ideology versus accountabilityÕ) Tan analyses the debt relief regime as expressing a 
palliative ethos, placing responsibility solely on borrowers; instead, she argues, we 
should understand financial stability as a global public good, and debt relief as an 
aspect of human rights and global distributive justice. It is only based on such a 
changed understanding of what the debt relief regime is for that we can identify 
appropriate institutional reforms. (ÔLife, debt and human rights: contextualizing the 
international regime for sovereign debt relief.Õ) 
 
The chapters on vulnerable populations also stand out, highlighting underemphasized 
aspects of IELÕs effects on poverty. Thus, Choudhury discusses the impact of IEL, 
and specifically investment arbitration, on women living in poverty. (ÔInternational 
economic law, women, and povertyÕ) Most readers will be familiar with critiques of 
investor-state arbitration in terms of both democracy and development. However, 
Choudhury shows how the costs of liberalization may be disproportionately borne by 
women in particular cases, and how liberalization interacts with social norms in 
particular contexts for further amplify those costs, problems that may be less familiar. 
Similarly Hess-Klein brings a new perspective to familiar critiques of the TRIPs 
agreement, showing how both national and international copyright protections impede 
access to knowledge for persons with visual impairment or other disability. (ÔThe 
book famine: International copyright rules as barriers to knowledge for impoverished 
persons with disabilitiesÕ) This is further linked to specific legal protections for the 
rights of persons with disabilities to argue for a greater recognition of the interaction 
between these areas of law, recognizing that at present Òthe difficulties facing persons 
with disabilities remain largely invisible beyond the field of human rightsÓ. To the 
extent this reviewer is representative of IEL scholars, this claim is hard to fault. 
 
Returning to the three challenges to a more productive engagement between new 
normative approaches and IEL, outlined above, these might equally be applied to 
categorize the essays in this volume. The largest part of these falls under the first 
challenge: they highlight areas where existing approaches ignore or exacerbate 
problems of at least prima facie normative concern. By contrast the conceptual 
chapters, and a number of the applied chapters, take up the second and third 
challenges, elaborating normative standards applicable to those problems, and 
showing how those normative standards in turn prescribe particular institutional 
responses. Thus, despite quite different starting points, both volumes can be 
understood as part of the same broad project of destabilizing dominant approaches to 
IEL, and proposing plausible alternatives. 
 
IV. 
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I began with an account of the challenges facing new normative approaches to IEL. 
The volumes under review each address these challenges, albeit in quite different 
ways. One is self-consciously theoretical. The other largely eschews theory, instead 
concentrating on a single issue of undeniable moral concern. I have sought to 
emphasize above the limitations of both approaches. It therefore seems apt, by way of 
conclusion, to consider whether either should be preferred to the other, or indeed 
whether they might be fruitfully integrated. 
 
Amartya Sen criticizes contemporary thinking in political philosophy about justice, 
whether within or beyond the state, as engaged in sterile debates about ideal justice, 
an approach he labels transcendental institutionalism. He contrasts this with an 
approach he describes as realization-focused comparison, which addresses clear cases 
of injustice, without needing first to identify what perfect justice would require.
23
 The 
merits of this latter approach are substantially the merits of the poverty approach to 
IEL. It allows us to gather a broad church in support of specific reforms, without 
needing to resolve all of our underlying disagreements. It thus avoids constant, 
fruitless debate. We do not need to know whether freedom should be understood in 
political or perfectionist terms, or whether justice should focus on welfare, resources 
or capabilities, to recognize a moral imperative to alleviate absolute poverty. By 
contrast, if we allow ourselves to get caught up in these questions, we may fail to act 
on that clear imperative. 
 
However neither global justice nor IEL reduces to poverty alleviation. Questions of 
justice, of fairness, and of rights, arise above this minimal level. Further, in many 
cases we find normative claims in apparent competition. Even if we focus solely on 
absolute poverty, we face questions about the appropriate agents, powers and 
structures for addressing that challenge. Many of these subsequent questions cannot 
be resolved without first clarifying why exactly we regard poverty as imposing moral 
obligations, and how those obligations relate to others that we may recognize, 
whether towards other persons or groups, or in terms of other values. It is in 
answering these questions that philosophical accounts of global justice can be of 
value. 
 
Rather than choosing between these normative lenses, then, we might regard them as 
parallel rather than competing approaches. The key question, as so often, is not 
whether one approach or other is better, but rather which is more useful in a particular 
context. For IEL scholars, however, the era of automatic recourse to economic 
analysis is, if not over, at least ending. Even if we do not draw on these new 
approaches, it is at least incumbent on us to become familiar with them, and to 
recognize when they might add value to our work. To the extent that is the case, either 
of these volumes would be a good place to start. 
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